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But if. ... 
Today's scholars generally feel closer to Brandeis, the idealis-
tic but practical reformer, than to Holmes, the detached, philo-
sophical skeptic. One supposes, for instance, that a typical bright 
law review editor or law professor would choose Brandeis's side 
over Holmes's, not only of most of the general questions about 
which they differed, but also of most specific controversies. 
This idle thought led to a project: to find cases in which the 
great men were on opposite sides, and then look up the reactions 
of the leading law reviews of the day. I In the law school of the 
1920s, did Holmes seem sounder? Were the students then more 
conservative and consequently more ambivalent about Brandeis? 
In the interest of economy, and because both justices were so 
articulate, we limited our research to constitutional cases--ones in 
which each of them wrote an opinion. We found none in which 
Holmes wrote a dissent from a majority opinion by Brandeis, but 
five in which Brandeis dissented from one by Holmes.2 Two of 
these cases attracted some attention. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon is the more famous. This decision has become one of the 
old chestnuts of just-compensation law, cited whenever a court-
usually a state court---<lecides that a regulation is an unconstitu-
tional "taking." It is a good barometer of attitudes because the 
majority and dissent both had powerful arguments; even today it 
would be an excellent moot-court case. If the student editors of 
the 1920s were more conservative about property rights than their 
modern counterparts, that tendency should be evident in their re-
sponses to this borderline decision. 
You will recall the facts. Many Pennsylvanians owned only 
surface rights in the land on which their homes were built, having 
purchased the surface from coal companies by deeds that ex-
pressly reserved mining rights. The deeds specifically declared 
that "the grantee takes the premises with the risk, and waives all 
I. We chose Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Illinois (Northwestern), Michigan, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. Virginia, Minnesota. and California. 
2. Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928); United States ex rei. Hughes v. 
Gault. 271 U.S. 142 (1926); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States. 260 
U.S. 327 (1922); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Horning v. District 
of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135 (1920). Tom Woxland of the University of Minnesota Law 
Library provided imaginative. unstinting, and invaluable assistance in our research. 
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claim for damages that may arise from mining out the coal."J The 
state legislature subsequently passed a law forbidding coal mining 
wherever it would cause the subsidence of residences. In an opin-
ion by Holmes, the Court held that this law was a taking of the 
company's subsurface property rights and as such unconstitu-
tional without compensation. Brandeis wrote a strong dissent. 
Constitutional experts were divided about this case. Profes-
sor Frankfurter privately agreed with Brandeis.4 But Thomas 
Reed Powell sided with Holmes, calling the case a classic illustra-
tion of the difference between "reasoning" and "reasonableness." 
Brandeis's dissent "moves skillfully step by step, and no single 
step is stretch enough to cause a stumble. Yet the journey as a 
whole takes us beyond the point at which reasonableness would 
naturally call a halt."s 
What did the Harvard Law Review's editors, in the days of 
Landis and Leach, have to say? The Review's student commenta-
tor came at the case from a political angle.6 Citing Cardozo's Na-
ture of the Judicial Process, he wrote that "[t]his case illustrates 
strikingly how much the determination of the extent to which a 
state may go in restricting the use of property or the enforcement 
of contracts depends upon considerations of statesmanship." 
Since neither the constitutional text nor precedent is helpful here, 
"[p]erhaps their own economic or social views control" the judges, 
citing Cardozo again. "Thus, the majority opinion minimizes the 
public danger involved, and treats the statute as designed primar-
ily to enhance property values at the expense of the coal owners," 
while "[t]he dissent, on the other hand, emphasizes the weight to 
be accorded the findings of the state legislature and court as to the 
existence of an emergency, and considers the public safety rather 
than property values as the primary object of the legislative pro-
tection. . . . The difference in result thus reached would indicate 
that a state may perhaps go farther to protect the lives and health 
of its people than to secure their interests of substance." 
The Yale Law Review disposed of Pennsylvania Coal in a 
short paragraph.? As at Harvard, the student author supposed 
3. 260 U.S. at 412. 
4. M. PARRISH, fELIX fRANKFURTER AND His TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 167 
(1982). However, Professor Parrish's citation for this (footnote 63) is obviously incorrect. 
He believes that the last authority cited in footnote 62 would be correct. 
5. Powell, Reasoning, Reasonableness and the Pennsylvania Surface Subsidence Case, 
I N.Y. L. REV. 242, 243 (1923). 
6. 36 HARV. L. REV. 753-54 (1923). 
7. 32 YALE L.J. 511 (1923). 
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that the decision had been determined by extralegal considera-
tions. His authority for such "realism" was the master himself: 
Again the articulate social policy of a legislature is defeated by the "inarticu-
late major premise" of the courts. See Holmes Path of the Law. In view of the 
minority opinion in the instant case and the majority opinion in the state court, 
there would seem to be ample precedent to support this statute. The decision may 
be another indication of a recent tendency to narrow the scope of legislative 
power, which is perhaps to be expected after the extended emergency limits of 
war time. 
Several major law reviews ignored Pennsylvania Coa/.B 
Pennsylvania noted the case after the state court's decision, which 
it supported.9 Virginia's discussion was noncommittal. 10 To Min-
nesota's student author, the result was "in accord with settled 
principles."11 "The real test is one of reasonableness, taking into 
consideration both the public interest and the degree of regula-
tion." In a fine display of Scandinavian reserve, he declined to 
argue further. 
The Cal!fornia Law Review's analysis began by discussing 
some precedents, observing that the flexibility of judicial re-
sponses to just compensation issues had "left room for progressive 
measures, while indicating the existence of some constitutional 
limitation." 12 The Pennsylvania Coal opinion "is of particular sig-
nificance, in that Justice Holmes had been considered by some to 
be the proponent of modern views .... " To Holmes, "the statute 
is neither justified as a protection of public safety nor imbued with 
a public interest." This view, however, "does not seem to do jus-
tice to the facts." Holmes had contended that the fact that the 
homeowners' "risk has become a danger" does not warrant "giv-
ing to them of greater rights than they bought." The student au-
thor was unpersuaded. "The answer to this," he declared, "is best 
presented by the dissent which indicates the very apparent public 
interest and denies the existence of an individual or public capac-
ity to contract away or affect the state's right to regulate under the 
police power." Furthermore, "the decisions indicated by the dis-
sent, in which the fact that eminent domain was possible was held 
not to preclude the exercise of the police power, seem undist-
inguishable." Finally, "[i]f mining could be continued at all with 
profit" the case seems indistinguishable from zoning and other re-
strictions that have been upheld. 
8. We found no case notes in Columbia, Illinois (now Northwestern), or Michigan. 
9. 71 U. PA. L. REv. 77 (1922). 
10. 9 VA. L. REV. 457 (1923). 
II. 7 MINN. L. REV. 242-43 (1923). 
12. II CALIF. L. REV. 188-91 (1923). 
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The decision did not go completely unnoticed by the general 
press. The New Republic's anonymous editorial on the casel3 ap-
parently was written by Dean Acheson, who had been Brandeis's 
Secretary during the 1919-20 Term.I4 Like the student authors at 
Harvard and Yale, he saw Pennsylvania Coal as "an outstanding 
illustration of the way in which fundamental constitutional deci-
sions depend at bottom not upon ascertainable rules of law but 
upon personal judgment," citing-you guessed it-Justice 
Holmes. Holmes and Brandeis both argued "without logical 
flaw" from their respective premises, and "[t]he decision depends 
on the act of judgment in choosing between the premises." Bran-
deis, however, had the better precedents: "Certainly it would 
seem that the invasion of the rights of the coal owners in their coal 
was no greater than the invasion of the rights of the owners of 
liquor by the Volstead Act." Yet precedents are not ultimately 
controlling: 
[T]he Court has always the power to do as it frankly did here and in the Child 
Labor Case----call a halt in the trend of the law's development based solely upon 
its own conceptions of public policy. It is a supreme act of statesmanship, which 
under the Constitution has become the function of the Court, and it is far more 
important for the American people to recognize this and insist that the men who 
are to exercise the power truly represent the American democracy than it is to 
criticize any particular exercise of the power. 
This said, Acheson concluded that "Justice Brandeis's view 
seems the superior statesmanship." For "as this spinning globe 
comes to have living upon it more and more human beings, it is 
inevitable that the freedom of action of these individuals must be-
come more and more limited." After all, "property rights of the 
kind here in question are, as Justice Holmes has himself well said, 
merely rights to course of conduct." The social risk of suspending 
mining "under cities until the development of science permitted it 
to be safely done would be less than in burdening the government 
with the cost of buying outright all rights in the subsoil." Taxes, 
like regulations, "discourage individual initiative." 
Three of the remaining cases in which Holmes and Brandeis 
disagreed turned out to be less interesting, but we did find a nice 
criminal procedure case with constitutional overtones. In Horning 
v. District of Columbia the defendant was convicted of the crime 
of doing business as a pawnbroker in the District without a li-
cense. He had admitted moving his loan office into Virginia, 
maintaining a reception office in the District, and conducting 
13. NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 1923, at 136, 136-37. 
14. See I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 473 n.4 (M. Howe ed. 1953). 
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about fifty to seventy-five patrons a day across the line by automo-
bile, in order to evade the D.C. statute. The trial judge instructed 
the jury that the undisputed facts constituted a violation of the 
law; that failure to convict would evince a "wilful and flagrant 
disregard of the evidence and the law"; and that acquittal would 
be a "violation of your obligation as jurors." Although "I cannot 
tell you in so many words, to find defendant guilty," he con-
cluded, "what I say amounts to that." 
On behalf of a majority of five, Holmes pointed out that 
where the facts are not in dispute, "obviously the function of the 
jury if they do their duty is little more than formal." To be sure, 
the judge may not direct a verdict and the jury may bring in a 
verdict "in the teeth of both law and facts." But the judge must 
explain the application of the law to whatever state of facts the 
jury may find; he is no less entitled to do so when the facts are 
agreed. "Perhaps there was a regrettable peremptoriness of tone" 
but the jury "were allowed the technical right, if it can be called 
so, to decide against the law and the facts." If "the defendant 
suffered any wrong it was purely formal" since "on the facts ad-
mitted there was no doubt of his guilt." Is 
Justice McReynolds dissented without opinion, and Justice 
Brandeis wrote a dissent in which Chief Justice White and Justice 
Day joined.I6 Brandeis's opinion began with the proposition that 
although a judge may comment freely on the evidence, he may 
not direct a verdict of guilty in a criminal case even when the facts 
are undisputed. "What a judge is forbidden to do directly, he may 
not do by indirection." While he may "enlighten the understand-
ing of the jury and thereby influence their judgment," he "may 
not use undue influence." He may "persuade" but not "command 
or coerce." Here the instruction was a "moral command" and 
therefore improper. Given the constitutional right to a jury trial, 
such an error is not merely formal. 
Of our sample of law reviews, five noted this decision. The 
discussions in Minnesota and Michigan were inconclusive. Yale's 
author said that the decision was in accordance with "the modern 
tendency" ainong state courts.n "[I]t is proper for the court to 
warn the jury against exercising their power of disregarding the 
law and the evidence in violation of their moral duty, and ... no 
substantive rights of the defendant are violated, as it is not to be 
15. 254 U.S. at 138-39. 
16. /d. at 139-40. 
17. 30 YALE L.J. 421 (1921). 
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presumed that a jury will find in opposition to the law from mere 
whim, caprice, or prejudice, for all their power to do so." 
Harvard's author disliked the decision. Since the instruction 
"was clearly coercive," the verdict "was not the free decision of 
the jury."ts The Court's decision, therefore, reached "the ques-
tionable result of allowing a presiding judge indirectly to compel a 
verdict of guilty." Since the accused's actual guilt would not jus-
tify a literal directed verdict, it also does not justify this sort of 
compulsion. 
The Columbia Law Review scornfully dismissed Holmes's 
reasoning: t9 
[T]he court is not privileged to direct a verdict indirectly, any more than directly. 
In the instant case, that the charge might well have unduly influenced the jury is 
obvious. Moreover, the distinction which the majority opinion attempts to draw 
between a charge which directs a verdict in so many words and a charge which 
'amounts to' a directed verdict is absurd. 
Agreeing with Brandeis, the editor rejected the idea that only a 
technical right was involved, pointing out that trial by jury is 
guaranteed by the Constitution. 
It is interesting to compare the formalism of the Horning 
opinions and commentary with the self-conscious and facile real-
ism of the reactions to Pennsylvania Coal. The proper disposition 
of a just compensation case, we are told, requires "statesmanship" 
about property, while a criminal procedure case should be re-
solved by syllogisms about rights. The dissenters' view in Horning 
ultimately became the law. But it was hardly due to inescapable 
logic. Notwithstanding the maxim cited by Justice Brandeis, 
much of life involves doing indirectly what the law forbids us to 
do directly. The analogy to a directed verdict in Horning was no 
more irresistible than the analogy in Pennsylvania Coal to a literal 
expropriation. In deciding how forcefully a judge should be al-
lowed to exhort the jurors to follow the law when the facts are 
undisputed and guilt is clear, the real question is whether to inter-
pret the rule against directed verdicts narrowly or expansively. 
Neither of the jurists, and none of the student commentators, even 
alluded to the possibility of answering this question by weighing 
the pros and cons of jury nullification. 
Of course, one shouldn't be too smug about this sort of thing. 
We all rely on ipse dixits. In the 1920s, judges were still expected 
to be oracular, and student editors reportorial. Both classes had 
18. 34 HARV. L. REV. 442, 443 (1921). 
19. 21 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 191 (1921). 
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only just begun to realize that their true vocation 1s to write 
treatises. 
No firm conclusions should be drawn from our tiny sample of 
reactions to Pennsylvania Coal and Horning. They are, however, 
some evidence that the attitudes of editors in the twenties did not 
differ much from those of their grandchildren. They brought less 
learning to bear on the cases, because less was available. But they 
did not need an environmental movement, or a Great Depression, 
to convince them that property rights should yield to the state. 
And in criminal procedure, too, they sound thoroughly modern. 
D.P.B. 
